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Abstract 
Controlling IS offshoring projects is a great challenge because of the inherent 
uncertainty of such projects. In such settings, informal controls are assumed to become 
increasingly effective. However, still little is known about the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of informal controls. We argue that the vendor manager’s power distance 
orientation—a key cultural construct that reflects beliefs about status, authority, and 
power in organizations—represents a missing antecedent of informal control 
effectiveness. Analyzing data from 57 client-vendor matched pairs, we found that high 
power distance on the part of the vendor manager negatively impacts project 
performance but at the same time positively moderates the relationship between self-
control and performance. 
Keywords:  IS project control, informal control, power distance, IS offshoring 
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Introduction 
Exercising control is essential for the success of information systems (IS) projects (Gopal and Gosain 
2010; Kirsch 2004; Tiwana and Keil 2009). Here, control is defined as any attempt to motivate 
individuals to achieve desired objectives, and can be exercised via formal and informal control 
mechanisms (Kirsch et al. 2002). Formal controls rely on adherence to performance standards or 
prescribed processes; informal controls rely on social or norm-emphasizing strategies (Kirsch 1997). 
While formal mechanisms often dominate the control portfolio, there is also strong consensus on the 
importance of informal control mechanisms (Jaworski 1988; Kirsch 2004; Kohli and Kettinger 2004).  
Complementing formal with informal controls becomes particularly important in the context of globally 
distributed projects (Kirsch 2004), such as IS offshoring projects. In this context, cultural, geographical, 
language, and time zone differences come into play (Mahnke et al. 2008; Tiwana and Keil 2009) and 
significantly increase uncertainty. Under such conditions of uncertainty, it is hard to exercise formal 
control because of the difficulty to (formally) specify desired individual behaviors and measure individual 
contributions to project outcomes with adequate precision (Kirsch et al. 2010; Ouchi 1979). For example, 
observing vendor behavior is often difficult and very costly in (offshore) outsourced projects because of 
the significant distance between the client and the vendor (Dibbern et al. 2008) and the relative absence 
of preexisting information channels (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). Furthermore, the control 
relationship between client and vendor often takes on a lateral rather than a hierarchical form (Tiwana 
2010; Tiwana and Keil 2007). Thus, the client may not have a formal position of authority over the 
vendor. This lack of formal authority may prevent the client from exercising formal control, and instead 
lead to an increased reliance on informal control (Kirsch et al. 2002).  
Despite the criticality of informal control in driving IS offshoring projects, research on the effectiveness of 
informal control in (offshore) outsourced IS projects has produced mixed results. For example, while 
Tiwana and Keil (2009) found that clan control does not influence performance in outsourced projects, 
Gopal and Gosain (2010) observed a significant effect of clan control on performance. The inconsistency 
of these results may be traced back to hidden moderator variables. According to Tiwana (2010), culture 
may be one key variable moderating the effectiveness of informal control. This is because important 
antecedents of informal control effectiveness, such as shared values, beliefs, and traditions (Ouchi 1979; 
Tiwana and Keil 2009) also constitute fundamental aspects of culture.  
Prior literature has identified a number of cultural values. One important cultural value is power distance, 
which describes the extent to which individuals accept unequal distribution of power in institutions and 
organizations (Hofstede 2001). Power distance has a more theoretically direct relationship to control 
issues than other cultural values because it deals with central control aspects, such as beliefs about status, 
authority, and power in organizations (Kirkman et al. 2009). For example, results from prior literature 
suggest that informal ways of control may be effective for individuals with a low power distance 
orientation but ineffective for those with a high power distance orientation (Newman and Nollen 1996). 
Thus, an interesting theoretical and empirical question is how power distance influences the effectiveness 
of informal control. 
The context of our study is IS offshoring projects. At this point, it is important to note that in such projects 
usually the client manager does not have direct control over the vendor project team (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003). Instead, the client project manager (tier 1) executes control over the vendor project 
manager (tier 2), who in turn controls the vendor project team (tier 3) (Kirsch et al. 2002). The vendor 
project manager’s role includes boundary spanning, gate keeping, and mediating activities, and therefore 
represents a key role in managing IS offshoring projects (Mahnke et al. 2008). Similarly, Rai et al. (2009) 
argue that the vendor project manager “plays a critical role in the overall management and ultimate 
success of offshore IS projects” and that her/his “cultural values are indeed important” (p. 635). Thus, for 
the specific focus of this study, we concentrate on the client project manager (controller) and the vendor 
project manager (controllee) of this three-tier control system, and argue that particularly the vendor 
project manager’s power distance orientation becomes a crucial factor for the successful implementation 
of informal controls in IS offshoring projects. Furthermore, we also investigate the direct relationship 
between the vendor manager’s power distance orientation and IS offshoring project performance. This is 
because the ability of the client manager to make effective decisions highly depends on the vendor 
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manager’s communication of critical information, which, in turn, is influenced by the vendor manager’s 
power distance orientation (Botero and Van Dyne 2009). 
In the next section, we briefly introduce control theory, review prior literature and develop the research 
model and hypotheses. Subsequently, we explain the research methodology and present our empirical 
data analysis results. We conclude by discussing the paper’s findings and implications. 
Research Background and Hypotheses 
Control theory distinguishes between formal and informal control. Formal control involves the 
specification and evaluation of behaviors or outcomes, coupled with appropriate rewards or sanctions 
(Ouchi 1979). Informal control is social or people-based, focusing on the role that individual or group 
norms and values play in the exercise of control (Ouchi 1979), and is typically divided into clan and self-
control.  
Clan control operates when behavior is motivated by shared values and norms and a common vision, and 
individuals display a great deal of goal congruence, and “solidarity” and “regularity” in their relations with 
others by behaving in a manner that is consistent with agreed-upon behaviors (Ouchi 1979). Here, 
rewards and sanctions are based on whether individual members act in accordance with group values, 
norms, and objectives (Kirsch et al. 2002). Examples of clan controls include socialization (e.g., dinner 
meetings, games, social events) and trainings (Kirsch 1996; Kirsch et al. 2002). In our study, we view clan 
control as the mechanisms the controller uses to cultivate an environment around the controllee for 
aligning behaviors and project goals in a way that shared values and norms supportive to a project are 
retained and reinforced, while norms that obstruct the project are prevented (Chua et al. 2012). 
Self-control is consistent with the definition of self-management: individuals set their own goals, monitor 
their own work, and reward or sanction themselves accordingly (Kirsch 1996). Thus, control mechanisms 
supporting self-control are primarily implemented by the individual controllee (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003). However, prior literature (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch et al. 2002) 
suggests that controllers can encourage others to exercise self-control by appropriately structuring the 
work environment. This perspective takes into account Kirsch’s (1996) observation that controllers may 
need to intervene to ensure that controllees engage in self-control. For example, the controller could help 
redesign the vendor’s internal system testing procedures, thereby improving the controllee’s ability to 
exercise better internal control (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). 
Informal Control and Project Performance 
Clan control is particularly important in complex, multi-stakeholder projects (Chua et al. 2012) because it 
facilitates cooperation among stakeholders, and thus is expected to positively affect project performance. 
Clan control is also critical in projects with high uncertainty (Kirsch et al. 2002; Kirsch 2004; Kohli and 
Kettinger 2004) and projects where outcomes are unclear and behavior is hard to specify (Ouchi 1979). 
This is particularly true for IS offshoring projects, which strongly rely on cooperation and collaboration. 
Here, developing and reinforcing a collaborative culture are key for achieving project success. A 
collaborative culture ensures that project members can leverage the specific competences and skills of 
each member for relevant project tasks (Gopal and Gosain 2010). With clan control operating, project 
members will also be more open to expose their individual work outcomes to scrutiny by other members, 
ultimately improving project quality (Gopal and Gosain 2010). Clan control also fosters continuous 
communication flows and bilateral knowledge transfer (Kirsch et al. 2010)—important determinants of IS 
offshoring project success (Remus and Wiener 2009). 
IS offshoring projects usually involve carefully screened vendors with proven skills and expertise. Thus, 
providing the controllee with autonomy in managing the project, i.e., creating an environment where the 
controllee can effectively exercise self-control may be beneficial for achieving positive project outcomes. 
For example, it was found that promoting self-control and assisting individuals in the exercise of self-
control through training significantly enhances individual and organizational performance (Druskat and 
Wheeler 2003). Moreover, in their study on outsourced IS projects, Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) 
observed that assisting controllees in exercising self-control is a common response by controllers when 
faced with performance problems. 
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Although the importance of informal control is widely recognized, research on the effectiveness of 
informal control in interorganizational projects has so far produced mixed results. For example, Gopal 
and Gosain (2010) observe a positive link between clan control and project effectiveness, and a negative 
link between clan control and project efficiency. In contrast, Liu et al. (2008) find a positive link between 
informal control and efficiency in outsourced projects (informal control was modeled as a second-order 
factor that includes clan and self-control as latent constructs). Another study by Tiwana and Keil (2009) 
suggests that clan control does not influence performance in outsourced projects. They also find that self-
control (in terms of controllee-driven noncontrolling) increases performance in internal projects but 
decreases performance in outsourced projects. These inconsistent or even conflicting results may not only 
be traced back to different construct operationalizations but also to hidden variables moderating the 
relationship between informal control and project performance. As discussed above, one of these potential 
moderating variables is power distance. 
Direct Effect of Power Distance on Project Performance 
Power distance refers to the extent to which inequality among persons in different positions of formal 
power are viewed as a natural (and even desirable) aspect of the social order (Hofstede 2001). Even 
though power distance is seen as a collective phenomenon, it can only manifest itself through the 
individual (Straub et al. 2002) and then be aggregated to the collective. Prior research has also argued 
that there is substantial within-culture variation in value orientations arising from regional, ethnic, 
religious, and generational differences (Hofstede 2001). In line with prior research (e.g., Rai et al. 2009), 
we therefore argue that individuals espouse power distance values to differing degrees, and treat power 
distance as an individual difference variable. The research model is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
 
Individuals with high power distance orientation display great respect for those in superior positions and 
accept the view that responsibility for and authority in decision making is vested in the hands of superiors 
(Javidan et al. 2006). They also believe that those who are more senior in the hierarchy are more 
knowledgeable and experienced than the rest (Hofstede 2001). Therefore, it is likely that controllees with 
high power distance orientation will view controllers as those who are at a higher status level. A related 
assumption of high power distance individuals is that those who are higher in status are less willing to 
share and seek views from those who are lower in status. Thus, controllees are likely to feel less 
comfortable raising criticism and questions, or seeking feedback from the controllers even though they 
realize that the project is at risk or starts drifting. This is in line with Keil et al. (2007), who found that 
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individuals with high power distance orientation are less willing to report bad news about a project and its 
status than those with low levels of power distance orientation. Similarly, Botero and Van Dyne (2009) 
found that individuals with high power distance orientation are less likely to express constructive ideas, 
information and opinions for change to supervisors. In addition, De Luque and Sommer (2000) argue 
that for individuals with high power distance orientation, seeking feedback might be interpreted as an 
indirect criticism of the superior. Therefore, feedback is likely to be conveyed through a top-down process 
that is less information rich (De Luque and Sommer 2000). In contrast, in low power distance 
environments the decision-making process is more democratic and subordinates feel comfortable to 
participate in decisions that concern them (Adler 1997). A low power distance orientation also permits 
greater cooperation across groups and helps create a problem-solving environment (Couto and Vieira 
2004). All of this suggests that the controllee’s power distance orientation is a key factor in determining 
the way in which she or he communicates with the controller. The controllee’s communication behavior, 
in turn, has a strong impact on project performance. For example, Tushman and Katz (1980) found that 
project performance is strongly influenced by the external communication of gatekeepers (such as vendor 
project managers). Similarly, Iacovou et al. (2005) found that upward communication strongly affects IS 
project performance. Finally, the establishment of a continuous communication flow between client and 
vendor has been identified as a key factor for the successful implementation of IS offshoring projects 
(Remus and Wiener 2009). We therefore expect that controllees with a low power distance orientation 
will proactively exchange information and establish stable communication channels with the controller, 
thereby positively influencing IS offshoring project performance. By contrast, high power distance 
behavior of the controllee may hamper communication and lead to decisions based on incomplete 
information and ultimately poor project performance (Keil et al. 2007). Therefore, we suggest: 
H1. The higher the power distance orientation of the controllee the lower the performance of the IS 
offshoring project. 
Moderating Effect of Power Distance on the Relationship between Informal 
Control and Project Performance 
According to Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003), all clan control mechanisms require some sort of 
participation. Individuals with low power distance orientation feel comfortable with high levels of 
involvement and face-to-face interaction (Jaeger 1986). They are less attuned to distinctions arising from 
status positions, are willing to consult with others, and value equal participation in the decision making 
process (Adler 1997; Atwater et al. 2009). Low power distance behavior was also found to facilitate the 
creation of a collaborative problem-solving environment (Couto and Vieira 2004), as well as trust and 
solidarity among individuals (Doney et al. 1998). Thus, the establishment of a clan control environment 
seems to be particularly conducive to project performance when team members display low power 
distance behavior. For example, in order to reduce software defects, the controller may try to create an 
environment where actively exposing individual work outcomes to scrutiny by other project members is 
the norm. It is likely that such an environment is only effective for low power distance individuals who 
prefer open and consultative relationships. In contrast, such an environment would likely be less effective 
for individuals with high power distance orientation as they tend to resist working with others in teams 
(Kirkman and Shapiro 2001). This rationale is also supported by prior literature (Newman and Nollen 
1996) which suggests that individuals with low power distance orientation show higher performance in 
participative environments as compared to those with high power distance orientation. Consequently, we 
predict: 
H2. Clan control positively affects IS offshoring project performance as power distance orientation of 
the controllee decreases. 
According to Hofstede (1984), individuals with high power distance orientation emphasize norms of 
conformity, i.e., doing what is accepted and proper (Doney et al. 1998). For example, individuals with high 
power distance orientation feel a duty-bound loyalty in their relationships (Hofstede 1984). Similarly, 
Clugston et al. (2000) observed that individuals with high power distance orientation show a strong 
commitment toward their supervisors. Furthermore, encouraging controllees with high power distance to 
exercise self-control may override their low sense of agency and signal them that they are perceived as 
being task-competent (Gardner et al. 2004), thereby motivating them to use their technical expertise 
without interference to complete the project in a manner that they believe will best satisfy the controller’s 
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needs. Additionally, as individuals who are high in power distance orientation believe that their leaders 
are superior and elite, they seem to be highly motivated to behave in ways that benefit their leaders 
(Javidan et al. 2006). Thus, high power distance controllees who receive assistance in exercising self-
control might be motivated to reciprocate by engaging in extra-role behavior—i.e., accommodating 
requests that go beyond the normal demands and requirements of the contract (Van Dyne et al. 1995)—
thereby enhancing project performance. Therefore, we predict: 
H3. Self-control positively affects IS offshoring project performance as power distance orientation of the 
controllee increases. 
Research Methodology 
To test the relationships hypothesized in our research model, we adopted a survey-based approach and 
developed matched-pair survey instruments. Client project managers (controllers) were surveyed on their 
use of informal control mechanisms within the examined project as well as project performance. In our 
study, the controller is seen as the assessor of project outcomes (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). This is 
because the controller is the authority who accepts and approves project results. The controller is also 
closer to the context where the delivered artifact is used and therefore in a better position to assess the 
fulfillment of project goals (Tiwana and Keil 2009). Vendor project managers (controllees) responded to 
items about their power distance orientation and other cultural values. Both, client and vendor managers 
provided information about their position and professional experience. This multi-informant approach 
reduces the threat of common rater bias, a major source of common method biases (Podsakoff et al. 
2003)1. To host the survey instruments, a website was launched in 2010. The data collection was 
conducted in 2010 and 2012. We also prepared paper-based questionnaires to eliminate coverage error 
(Schaefer and Dillman 1998). 
Data Collection 
We used a convenience sample to collect the survey data. To identify appropriate projects and 
respondents, we contacted management executives of client and offshore vendor firms. The executives 
were professional acquaintances of one of the authors. The use of this “known sponsor approach” (Patton 
1990) resulted in immediate legitimacy and credibility of the research team and study, and ensured the 
appropriateness of the ultimate respondents (Rustagi et al. 2008). If an executive agreed to participate, 
she/he was asked to nominate suitable projects and respondents. To ensure the quality of the data set, 
projects and respondents had to satisfy three criteria for inclusion in the sample. First, projects either had 
to be completed for not more than twelve months, or had to be underway for at least three months and 
already reached at least one critical milestone. This ensured that respondents were able to reliably 
respond to the survey. Second, the client and vendor members of a dyad must have had operated in their 
roles for at least two months. Establishing this criterion ensured that the dyads have had adequate time to 
develop a relationship (Rustagi et al. 2008). Third, projects had to allow access to both a client project 
manager and her/his vendor counterpart. 
As an a priori strategy to minimize non-response error and its impact on the validity of inferences, we 
used Dillman’s (2007) Tailored Design Method (TDM). With this method, multiple contacts with the 
target population are made to maximize response. Of the 18 executives who were initially requested to 
participate in the study, 14 agreed (twelve client and two vendor executives). The 14 participating 
executives invited a total of 118 client and vendor project managers to fill in the questionnaire (the 
executives did not fill in the questionnaire). Altogether, 116 respondents (57 client and 59 vendor 
managers) participated in our study, resulting in a response rate of 98 %. In order to form one data record 
for each matched pair, the matching client and vendor data records were joined based on a unique ID. 
Two non-paired data records were dropped from the analysis, resulting in a sample size of 57 matched 
pairs from 57 IS offshoring projects and independent sub-projects of large offshore arrangements. Follow-
up communications with non-participants as well as a comparison of early and late respondents provided 
                                                             
1 We conducted two tests to control for common method bias: Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff et al. 
2003), and pairwise correlation analysis (Bagozzi et al. 1991). Based on the test results, we are confident 
that our study results are not due to common method bias. 
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assurance against non-response bias (Armstrong and Overton 1977). For all items, the difference between 
minimum and maximum values was 3 or even 4 scale points, the latter referring to the maximum possible 
range. 
Construct Measures 
Generally accepted guidelines were followed in developing the measurement instruments. All latent 
variables were measured with multiple items and operationalized at the unit of analysis, the client-vendor 
dyad. Consistent with prior studies on IS project control (e.g., Tiwana 2010; Tiwana and Keil 2009), we 
adopted Kirsch et al.’s (2002) items to measure clan control, and adapted Brief and Aldag (1981), 
Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003), and Kirsch et al.’s (2002) items for self-control. For project 
performance, we adapted well-tested items from prior IS research (Banker and Kemerer 1992; Kirsch 
1996; Kumar and Bjørn-Andersen 1990). Measures for the power distance dimension and other cultural 
values were adopted from Hofstede’s “Values Survey Module” (1994). All constructs were measured 
reflectively. Except for the demographic items, all items were rated on five-point Likert scales.  
Construct measures were pretested and refined using a convenience sample of five IS (project) managers 
and six academic experts with expertise in IS offshoring and survey design. Additionally, we conducted a 
pilot study with eleven respondents (eight client and three vendor representatives) involved in a large-
scale IS offshoring arrangement resulting in minor adaptations in the wording of some measures. 
Respondents in the pilot study were not in the main sample. 
To test our hypotheses, we constructed two separate models: one for the moderating effect of the 
controllee’s power distance orientation on the relationship between clan control and IS offshoring project 
performance (model A), and one for the moderating effect of power distance orientation on the 
relationship between self-control and project performance (model B). This ensured sufficient statistical 
power to detect the relationships in the structural models. 
We checked for item reliability by analyzing item loadings using the partial least squares (PLS) path 
weighting scheme. Two power distance items, two clan control item, and one self-control item were 
removed from the model due to loadings lower than 0.6 (Nunnally 1978). All remaining items loaded 
above 0.70. All measures clearly exceeded the critical value of 0.7 for composite reliability (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981), thus indicating construct reliability. The average variance extracted (AVE) for all 
constructs was greater than 0.5, establishing convergent validity for all scales (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
Moreover, each construct shares more variance with its assigned items than with any other construct, and 
within-construct item loadings are greater than their cross loadings, confirming discriminant validity for 
all variables in the models (Hulland 1999). We also tested the two models with an alternative formative 
specification of project performance, and found that this specification does not change our data analysis 
results. We therefore retained the reflective specification (Tiwana and Keil 2009). An overview of the 
operationalization of the constructs and the scale purification process, as well as the item cross loadings 
and the means, standard deviations and correlations among the latent constructs is provided in the 
appendix. 
We included two control variables in our analysis: project size and interfirm relationship history. Project 
size is considered as an important control variable in performance models in IS outsourcing (Pressman 
2001). Interfirm relationship history influences vendor capabilities, and hence project performance 
(Ethiraj et al. 2005). The control variables were measured by asking the client managers to assess the total 
project effort in person-months (proxy for project size), and indicate the client organization’s experience 
with the offshore vendor (proxy for interfirm relationship history) on three-point Likert scales. 
Descriptive Statistics 
We collected data from 57 offshore projects. 32 projects were executed with independent vendor 
organizations (third party vendors and global service providers), 24 with a subsidiary of the client firm, 
and one with a joint venture. We see both offshoring to independent vendors and offshoring to semi-
autonomous vendors owned by the client firm (captive centers) as comparable, because both variants of 
offshoring use market-based mechanisms (such as formal contracts) to govern the relationship, face 
similar control challenges (e.g., geographical, cultural, and language differences), and the literature tends 
to treat them as similar. For example, Levina and Vaast (2008) found that there were no significant 
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differences between a captive center and a third party vendor. In fact, they state “that along most of the 
dimensions suggested by the literature, managerial practices did not differ between the captive and the 
vendor” (p. 318). All client firms operate from German-speaking countries (twelve, four, and one from 
Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, respectively), and represent multiple industries (e.g., energy, 
healthcare, and manufacturing). 14 of them are large for-profit firms and three are small or medium-sized 
enterprises. 46 projects involved large-scale vendor organizations, while eleven projects involved small or 
medium-sized vendors. Approximately 70 % of the projects were offshored to India. The 57 client and 
vendor managers come from ten and seven different countries, respectively. 95 % of all client project 
managers stated that they had more than one year of experience in the IS offshoring field. More than 70 % 
of the vendor project managers indicated to have more than five years of experience in the IS offshoring 
field. Additional descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Project focus  # of projects Project size a # of projects 
Applications development/testing 49 Fewer than 25 PM 5 
Applications management 5 25 – 59 PM 10 
IS infrastructure management  
(managed services) 
3 
60 – 119 PM 8 
120 – 599 PM 24 
More than 599 PM 10 
TOTAL 57 
 
57 
Note: a In person months (PM). 
 
Data Analysis and Results 
We chose the PLS estimation method because it is very useful as a predictive method (Fornell 1992) and 
“remarkably stable even at low sample sizes” (Gefen et al. 2011, p. A3). We used the software SmartPLS 
2.0 (Ringle et al. 2005) with a bootstrap size of 1.000 to assess the structural model. Applying the 
approach suggested by Carte and Russell (2003), we first entered the control variables (step 1), followed 
by the main effects (step 2), and the interaction terms (step 3). To test our hypotheses, we follow Chin et 
al.’s (1996) recommended approach to center reflective indicators for the main and moderating constructs 
and create all pair-wise product indicators where each indicator from the main construct is multiplied 
with each indicator from the moderating construct. The results of the PLS analysis are shown in Table 2. 
The control variables (step 1) explain 6.2 percent of the variance in IS offshoring project performance. 
Both variables are nonsignificant. Next, we turn our attention toward the main effects (step 2). Our results 
indicate a significantly negative, direct effect of power distance orientation on project performance (model 
A: β = -0.350, t-value = 3.04, p < 0.01; model B: β = -0.300, t-value = 2.85, p < 0.01), supporting 
hypothesis 1. The main effects explain an additional 10.1 and 15.8 percent variance in model A and model 
B, respectively, beyond the control variables. 
Finally, the interaction terms are used to assess the moderation hypotheses (step 3). While power distance 
orientation does not significantly moderate the relationship between clan control and performance 
(hypothesis 2), power distance orientation does significantly and positively moderate the relationship 
between self-control and performance (β = 0.276, t-value = 2.19, p < 0.05), thus supporting hypothesis 3. 
Note that the main effects must be restricted to step 2 and cannot be interpreted in the presence of the 
interaction terms in step 3, where they represent conditional simple effects (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).  
To assess the strength of the significant moderating effect, we calculated the effect size f2 as [R2 included - R2 
excluded] / [1 - R2 included] (Cohen 1988). The f2-value of 0.10 indicates a moderate interaction effect of 
controllee’s power distance orientation and controller’s use of self-control on project performance. Figure 
2 illustrates this interaction effect (values are mean centered). High (dotted lines) and low (solid lines) 
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levels of power distance orientation represent ±1 standard deviations from the mean. As shown in the 
interaction plot, self-control does only marginally decrease project performance in the low power distance 
case. However, in the high power distance case, self-control does increase performance. This case-
dependent visualization provides graphical evidence that a controllee’s high power distance orientation 
facilitates the effective use of self-controls.  
In separate tests, we also computed both models with alternative cultural values as moderator variables 
(i.e., individualism-collectivism and uncertainty avoidance). In addition, we tested for potential 
moderating effects of cultural values on the relationship between formal control (i.e., outcome and 
behavior control) and IS offshoring project performance. Similar tests were conducted for detecting 
potential effects of the controller’s cultural value orientations and cultural value differences between the 
controller and controllee. However, none of these tests revealed any significant effects. 
 
Table 2. PLS Analysis Results 
 Model A Model B 
 
Control 
variables 
(Step 1) 
Main 
effects 
(Step 2a) 
Interaction 
terms 
(Step 3a) 
Main 
effects 
(Step 2b) 
Interaction 
terms 
(Step 3b) 
Construct β β β β β 
Project size -0.247 -0.184 -0.210 -0.194 -0.172 
Interfirm history -0.059 -0.049 -0.039 -0.102 -0.104 
Clan control  -0.072 -0.039   
Self-control    0.268 0.252 
Power distance orientation  -0.350** -0.290* -0.300** -0.216* 
Clan control x  
Power distance orientation 
  -0.204   
Self-control x  
Power distance orientation 
    0.276* 
R2 (percent) 6.2 16.3 19.7 22.0 29.0 
∆ R2 (percentage point) -- 10.1 3.4 15.8 7.0 
Notes: Significant results in boldface. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; two-tailed test. 
 
Discussion 
The paper presents one of the first empirical studies on the interplay between informal control and 
cultural values. With this study we sought to understand how power distance at the individual-level 
influences the effectiveness of informal control. We also aimed at enhancing our understanding of how 
power distance orientation espoused by the vendor manager directly influences IS offshoring project 
performance. Our paper makes three significant contributions. First, our results suggest that self-control 
enhances project performance in high power distance contexts, thereby extending previous research on 
the interplay between cultural values and IS project control (e.g., Narayanaswamy and Henry 2005). 
Second, our finding that individual power distance orientation had a significant direct effect on 
performance answers calls for more attention to the effects of individual-level cultural values (Kirkman et 
al. 2006). Third, the integration of other cultural variables did not reveal any significant effects on the 
relationship between informal control and performance, emphasizing the importance of power distance 
orientation for control issues compared to other cultural values. 
Before discussing the study results and their implications, some limitations have to be mentioned. First, 
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in our study, a moderate sample of 57 matched controller-controllee pairs was used. To ensure sufficient 
statistical power, we divided our research model into two sub-models. Second, the sample size restricted 
the number of control variables in the models. There are several additional variables that potentially 
influence project performance such as team size (Gopal et al. 2003) and the nature of risk sharing (Rai et 
al. 2009). Third, the fact that most of the client and vendor respondents are German and Indian, 
respectively, could impact the generalizability of the results. 
 
 
Figure 2. Interactions of Self-Control and Power Distance on Project 
Performance 
 
Our results did not provide evidence of a significant interaction effect of clan control and power distance 
orientation in impacting project performance. According to Chua et al. (2012), enacting clan control is a 
dual process of building and leveraging the clan. Low power distance behavior on part of the vendor 
project manager may help developing a close connection and relationship with the client project manager, 
and thus contribute to building the clan to some extent. However, it may not be sufficient for establishing 
clan norms and values that can be rigorously enacted. This might explain why the vendor manager’s 
power distance orientation does not appear to make a significant difference in clan control effectiveness.  
Overall, our results provide strong evidence that the controllee’s high power distance orientation directly 
and negatively impacts IS offshoring project performance. While high power distance behavior may cause 
a lack of open and frequent interactions between controllers and controllees, thereby leading to decisions 
based on incomplete information and ultimately poor project performance, the opposite may be true for 
low power distance behavior. This finding adds to Dibbern et al.’s (2008) observation that the vendor’s 
high power distance may lead to poor performance in terms of client extra costs in German-Indian 
offshore application software projects. Furthermore, in their study on the impact of culture on IS 
offshoring project success, Winkler et al. (2008) suggest that misunderstandings between the German 
client and the Indian vendor which resulted in poor project performance may be traced back to high 
power distance behavior. The negative link between power distance orientation and project performance 
also extends Rai et al.’s (2009) finding that a vendor manager with high individual power distance 
orientation enhances client satisfaction in the absence of a client representative on the project team 
(please note that Rai et al. used client satisfaction as subjective success measure). They argue that project 
managers espousing high power distance enhance client satisfaction because such managers will comply 
with client directives. However, although simply complying to client directives may lead to higher client 
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satisfaction, it will not necessarily lead to better project performance as some directives may not be 
suitable for a given project situation. More empirical work is needed to shed light into this interesting 
issue. 
Finally, our findings suggest that the promotion of self-control by the controller is effective in increasing 
project performance when the controllee shows high power distance behavior. For example, the use of 
self-control may serve as a signal of the controller’s confidence in the controllee, thereby motivating the 
controllee to exhibit extra-role behavior (Tiwana and Keil 2009). When controllees exhibit extra-role 
behavior, they are likely motivated by high commitment to their controllers engendered by a high power 
distance orientation (Kirkman et al. 2009). Interestingly, high power distance orientation itself has a 
negative impact on performance. Thus, the promotion of self-control seems to compensate the negative 
effect of high power distance behavior on performance and even invert this effect into a positive one. 
Our results also have important implications for practice. First, clients need to be aware of the negative 
effects caused by high power distance behavior, and take actions to mitigate these effects. When clients 
encounter high power distance behavior on part of the vendor project manager, they should proactively 
call for constant feedback by the vendor managers, and communicate them that criticism is welcome. 
Furthermore, management approaches that primarily rely on personal interaction might need to be 
supplemented with other, less personal management techniques to ensure effective information exchange. 
For example, the use of standardized reporting forms (Levina and Vaast 2005), as well as models, maps, 
and objects (Carlile 2004) may be valuable boundary objects that help to elicit feedback. The use of such 
artifacts may improve feedback and communication, and ultimately project performance in high power 
distance settings, as potentially problematic behaviors such as the reluctance to voice criticism in face-to-
face meetings are circumnavigated. Second, if clients have to deal with a vendor project manager 
exhibiting high power distance orientation, they should try to enable and promote the exercise of self-
control. For example, clients could help the vendor design effective processes, or institute performance 
evaluation schemes that reward autonomy and self-management (Kirsch et al. 2002). This implication 
seems to be particularly relevant for practice since prior results suggest that clients are less likely to 
promote the use of self-control when vendor managers show high levels of power distance orientation 
(Heumann et al. 2011). 
Conclusions 
The main contribution of this study lies in showing that the vendor project manager’s power distance 
orientation represents an important antecedent of informal control effectiveness. More specifically, the 
results explain inconclusive results in prior literature by showing that clan and self-controls do not 
directly affect performance in (offshore) outsourced projects (Tiwana and Keil 2009). Here, the results 
highlight the dual role of espoused power distance orientation: as an indirect factor positively moderating 
the effective use of self-control and as a direct factor negatively influencing IS offshoring project 
performance. The latter finding points to the need to carefully select the client-vendor interface. This is an 
important topic for further research and an ongoing challenge for practice. 
Finally, much remains to be learned regarding cultural effects on the control-performance relationship. 
For instance, not only the cultural values of the vendor manager but also the cultural differences between 
the client and vendor manager may impact the effectiveness of controls. For example, large cultural 
differences may impede the creation of shared values and norms, hampering the effective implementation 
of clan controls. Future research should look at these cultural effects on the link between control and 
project performance, and in particular how to avoid or mitigate negative effects. 
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Appendices 
Table 3. Cross Loadings 
Model A 
 
Clan control 
Power 
distance 
Project 
performance 
Project size 
Interfirm 
history 
Clan control (CC3) 0.752 -0.143 -0.020 0.101 -0.051 
Clan control (CC4) 0.900 -0.070 -0.031 -0.081 0.115 
Power distance (PD2) -0.168 0.752 -0.255 -0.143 0.121 
Power distance (PD3) -0.030 0.829 -0.300 0.155 0.062 
Project performance (PP1) 0.027 -0.271 0.831 -0.102 -0.016 
Project performance (PP2) -0.117 -0.084 0.700 -0.136 -0.094 
Project performance (PP3) 0.000 -0.374 0.770 -0.018 -0.177 
Project performance (PP4) -0.046 -0.287 0.844 -0.306 0.027 
Project size -0.010 0.023 -0.187 1.000 -0.091 
Interfirm history 0.058 0.112 -0.076 -0.091 1.000 
Model B 
 Self-control Power 
distance 
Project 
performance 
Project size Interfirm 
history 
Self-control (SC2) 0.753 -0.088 0.172 -0.056 0.106 
Self-control (SC3) 0.819 -0.123 0.240 0.030 0.212 
Self-control (SC4) 0.797 -0.014 0.231 0.086 0.006 
Power distance (PD2) -0.222 0.746 -0.244 -0.143 0.121 
Power distance (PD3) 0.048 0.834 -0.294 0.155 0.062 
Project performance (PP1) 0.184 -0.270 0.823 -0.102 -0.016 
Project performance (PP2) 0.241 -0.085 0.729 -0.136 -0.094 
Project performance (PP3) 0.229 -0.373 0.767 -0.018 -0.177 
Project performance (PP4) 0.221 -0.288 0.836 -0.306 0.027 
Project size 0.034 0.026 -0.183 1.000 -0.091 
Interfirm history 0.138 0.111 -0.081 -0.091 1.000 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Constructs 
Model A 
Construct Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Clan control 4.298 0.690 0.829     
(2) Interfirm history 2.439 0.567 0.058 1.000    
(3) Performance 3.711 0.931 -0.031 -0.076 0.787   
(4) Power distance 2.167 0.808 -0.118 0.112 -0.352 0.792  
(5) Project size 3.421 1.224 -0.010 -0.091 -0.187 0.023 1.000 
Model B 
Construct Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Self-control 3.339 0.971 0.790     
(2) Interfirm history 2.439 0.567 0.138 1.000    
(3) Performance 3.711 0.931 0.275 -0.081 0.790   
(4) Power distance 2.167 0.808 -0.094 0.111 -0.341 0.791  
(5) Project size 3.421 1.224 0.034 -0.091 -0.183 0.026 1.000 
Note: Diagonal elements (bold face) show the square-root of average variance extracted for each 
construct. 
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Table 5. Model A: Operationalization and Psychometric Properties of Variables 
Construct Label Item Loading 
Composite 
reliability 
AVE Reference(s) 
Clan control CC1 I placed a significant weight on understanding the project 
team’s goals, values, and norms  
* 0.814 0.688 Kirsch et al. (2002) 
CC2 I actively participated in project meetings to understand the 
project team’s goals, values, and norms  
0.752 
CC3 I attempted to understand the project team’s goals, norms, 
and values  
0.900 
CC4 I attempted to be a “regular” member of the project team  * 
Power distance 
orientation 
PD1 I have a good working relationship with my direct superior a 
 
* 0.770 
 
0.627 
 
Hofstede (1994) 
PD2 I am consulted by my direct superior in her/his decisions ac 0.752 
PD3 How frequently are you afraid to express disagreement with 
your superiors? b 
0.829 
PD4 An organization structure in which certain subordinates 
have two bosses should be avoided at all costs 
* 
Project 
performance 
PP1 The project deliverables met the requirements 0.831 0.867 0.620 Banker and Kemerer (1992), 
Kirsch (1996), 
Kumar and Bjørn-Andersen (1990) 
PP2 The project deliverables were completed on time 0.700 
PP3 The project deliverables adhered to IS standards 0.770 
PP4 The project deliverables were completed within budgeted 
costs  
0.844 
Notes: All instrument items are based on five-point Likert scales, predominantly using “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” anchors. a Using “utmost 
importance” and “no importance” anchors, b Using “very frequently” and “very seldom” anchors, c Reverse coded, * Based on the instrument validation process, 
item was deleted (this did not change the pattern of significant paths). 
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Table 6. Model B: Operationalization and Psychometric Properties of Variables 
Construct Label Item Loading 
Composite 
reliability 
AVE Reference(s) 
Self-control SC1 I established an appropriate environment for self-
management d by communicating to the supplier that self-
management is valued 
* 0.833 0.624 Brief and Aldag (1981), 
Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003), 
Kirsch et al. (2002) 
SC2 I introduced performance evaluation schemes that reward 
self-management 
0.753 
SC3 I enhanced the supplier’s ability to exercise better self-
management  
0.819 
SC4 I trained the supplier in appropriate techniques for self-
management 
0.797 
Power distance 
orientation 
PD1 I have a good working relationship with my direct superior a 
 
* 0.770 0.626 Hofstede (1994) 
PD2 I am consulted by my direct superior in her/his decisions ac 0.746 
PD3 How frequently are you afraid to express disagreement with 
your superiors? b 
0.834 
PD4 An organization structure in which certain subordinates have 
two bosses should be avoided at all costs 
* 
Project  
performance 
PP1 The project deliverables met the requirements 0.823 0.869 0.624 Banker and Kemerer (1992), 
Kirsch (1996), 
Kumar and Bjørn-Andersen (1990) 
PP2 The project deliverables were completed on time 0.729 
PP3 The project deliverables adhered to IS standards 0.767 
PP4 The project deliverables were completed within budgeted 
costs  
0.836 
Notes: All instrument items are based on five-point Likert scales, predominantly using “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” anchors. a Using “utmost 
importance” and “no importance” anchors, b Using “very frequently” and “very seldom” anchors, c Reverse coded, d According to Kirsch (1996), the definition of 
self-management is consistent with the concept of self-control, * Based on the instrument validation process, item was deleted (this did not change the pattern 
of significant paths). 
 
